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COMMON LAW WRITS
Writ of Error and Writ of Certiorari: Writ of error has
been abolished in South Carolina. Sec. 7-1. Statutory appeal,
as heretofore mentioned, has taken its place. As to the various courts of record, South Carolina has endowed all of them
with the power of using the old common law writs, but no
specific mention is made of the writs of coram nobis, scire
facias, supersedeas and procendo. Art. 5, Section 4 and Section 15 of the South Carolina Constitution. However, Art. 5,
Section 4 gives to the Supreme Court power to use "other
original and remedial writs." It has, however, never had to
go outside of those specifically mentioned, as they in themselves are a veritable arsenal of legal weapons. In place of
the writ of supersedeas, South Carolina has Rules of Court,
both Supreme and Circuit, and code sections too numerous
to list here. Attention is called to the Code Index "Stay or
Supersedeas" and also to that same heading under "Appeals".

Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of the Circuit
Court have the same power at chambers that they have in
open court. Art. 5, Section 25. Under the provisions of the
several county court Sections the judges of those courts have
similar powers.
In those jurisdictions where the common law writ of error
is used it does not lie except to a court of record when exercising its jurisdiction substantially according to the course of
the common law. The writ is sent down from the reviewing
court to the trial court. When the writ is not useable, as in
this State, unless statutory review or appeal has been provided
for, some other writ must be used; usually certiorari. Where
writ of error is useable the reviewing court must grant it as
a matter of right; it has no discretion. Certiorari, however, is
grantable at the court's discretion.
There is another distinction between the two writs at common law, which has been much modified by statute or judicial
sanction, and that is the writ of error only carried up errors
of law, while certiorari opened the door only to inquiry as to
the trial court's jurisdiction and also whether it proceeded
legally. This latter was a rather dubious phrase but it was
construed to mean: did the trial court follow the form of
proceeding legally applicable in such cases but not whether its
rulings were correct or not. In Temonds v. Hunter (1915),
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16 Iowa 598, 151 N. W. 961, it was held that to refuse one a
jury upon proper demand was proceeding illegally and certiorari was useable.
In South Carolina a statute, Sec. 7-14, allows certiorari to
be used just like our statutory appeal, where no other provision is made for reviewing a cause tried in a magistrate or
municipal court.
Also, without the aid of any statute, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has judicially liberalized the old writ by allowing errors of law to be reviewed, thereby closing the common law door to injustices that would sometimes eventuate
where our legislature had failed to provide for review by
appeal. Where there was such oversight, errors in courts not
of record or when such courts were exercising jurisdiction in
hearing matters unknown to the common law and also error
in matters before quasi-judicial bodies would not be subject
to review at all.
But now in South Carolina, as in many other jurisdictions,
the writ can be used to review quasi-judicial as well as judicial
action and in correcting errors of law. In State v. Ansel
(1906), 76 S. C. 395, 57 S. E. 185, at page 397, one is told:
. . . The writ of certiorariwill not be issued unless it
appears that it will be available to relieve some actual and
substantial wrong or injury of the applicant. Mechem
on Public Officers, Sec. 1006....
And at page 403:
. * . It is a well established rule of law that certiorari
will not lie to review a decision resting in the discretion
of the officer or tribunal rendering it. Throop on Public
Officers, Secs. 802, 810; Mechem on Public Officers, Sec.
1005; 2 Spelling on Ex. Relief; 6 Cyc., 756; 4 Ency. P1.
& Pr., 81.
And at page 412 the function of the writ is set forth:
... As we have no controlling case in this State on the
subject, we will briefly consider the question on principle.
The writ of certiorariis issued by a superior Court to an
inferior judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal or officer to
certify the record of trial to the superior Court for its review to ascertain whether the inferior tribunal had jurisdiction or exceeded its powers, or committed substantial

errors of law, but not to review the facts. Ex parte Riggs,
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supra. It is suggested that a Governor can never be an inferior tribunal since he is the Supreme Executive Officer.
This reason would be impregnable if the Constitution,
which vested the Supreme and Circuit Courts with the judicial power, had at the same time created the Governor a
judicial tribunal or made it his executive function to remove officers for cause after notice and opportunity for
hearing. Then it could be said the power of removal,
whether judicial or executive, was a co-ordinate power

beyond the control of the regular Courts, just as the
high Court of impeachment would be. In this case, however, the Governor does not derive his power to remove
directly from the Constitution, but by creation of an act
of the legislature. Therefore, if the power to remove
officers is judicial, the tribunal designated to exercise
the power is judicial, and must of necessity be an inferior
jurisdiction in a legal sense, because the legislature is
wholly without power to create a judicial tribunal which
is not inferior to the judicial power vested in the Supreme
and Circuit Courts....
And at page 414 one finds out why the writ of certiorari
will lie in a proper case (which this case was not) against
the Governor and why the writ of mandamus will not lie:
For the purpose of this question it may be conceded
that the weight of authority and reason are in favor of
the view that mandamus should not lie to the Governor
to compel performance of an executive duty, whether
ministerial or not, since there may be no good ground
for a distinction between an executive duty which is ministerial and an executive duty which is not ministerial.
But mandamus and certiorarirest on distinct and opposite principles, the former compels an unperformed ministerial duty; the latter reviews a performed judicial
duty, while neither operates to control discretion, the
former never goes to control judgment, while the latter
never goes except to review and control judicial judgment....
In Wyse v. Wolf, Atty. Gen. (1924), 129 S. C. 499, 123
S. E. 818, the following brief summary of the writ's function
is given:
It will thus be seen that there are two grounds of
dissatisfaction, namely: An unwise exercise of discertion
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[discretion] on the part of the Governor; and a defect
in the election law. This is a proceeding in certiorari.
Certioraricannot be used to control the discretion lodged
by law in the Chief Executive, or to remedy a defect in
the law. The province of certiorariis declared in State
v. Senft, 2 Hill, 369:
"The writ of certiorari is a common-law remedy, to
correct errors in law of inferior jurisdiction." Corpus
Juris, vol. 11, pp. 106, 107.
"The writ will not lie to review errors or mistakes in
matters of discretion, where the Court has acted within
its jurisdiction, and where there has been no disregard
by the Court of the procedure prescribed by law."
See Laney v. Baskin (1942), 201 S. C. 246, 22 S. E. 2d 722,
for use of writ in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court against the State Democratic Executive Committee with
reference to its declaration regarding certain election results
in Lee County.
And in Pettifordv. S. C. State Board of Education (1950),
218 S.C. 322, 62 S.E. 2d 780, there is no doubt left as to the
exact function of the writ. In adopting as its opinion that
of trial Judge Greneker it is declared:
The purpose and scope of writs of ceritorariare clearly
expressed by The Supreme Court of South Carolina in
Feldrmanv. South Carolina Tax Commission, 203 S. C. 49,
26 S.E. (2d) 22, 24, where it states: "A writ of certiorari cannot be made a substitute for an appeal or writ of
error, as seems to have been done in this case. We have
held in numerous cases that this Court on writ of certiorari will confine its review to the correction of errors of
law only, and will not review the findings of fact of an
inferior Court or body except when such findings are
wholly unsupported by the evidence. [Cases cited.]
Judges of the Courts of Common Pleas are bound by the
same rule and limitation. [Cases cited.]
In criminal cases Section 7-14 liberalizes greatly the use
of the writ as an additional method of review of such cases
from a magistrate's or municipal court. It can be used then
as a short cut for reviewing even directly to a Justice of the
Supreme Court in open court or at chambers.
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Certiorari lies only when there is no other adequate remedy
at law. When a legislature provides for certain redress but
fails to provide for a review by way of appeal, then certiorari
must be used to have justice done; also, in the appellate court's
discretion it is useable even though there is the right of appeal but the latter would be inadequate. Temonds v. Hunter,
ante.
Writs of Quo Warranto and Scire Facias: As to the writ
of quo warranto, which was one of the old writs adopted and
made a part of the state's judicial procedure by the Constitution of 1895, there is still confusion. The legislature "abolished" the writ by the Act of 1870, now Sections 10-2251 to
10-2271. However, the legislature preserved the old writ and
all its essentials by providing that "the remedies previously
obtainable in those forms may be obtained by civil actions
under the provisions of this chapter" of the 1952 Code, Section 10-2251. So, we really have the substance of the old writ
in another form, though it does seem that some of the differences in form as set forth by the legislature can, at times, intrinsically affect one's substantive right, as for instance,
where the "civil action" has to be used in place of the old
useable "order to show cause."
The confusion mentioned above lies in the fact that, although the Codes, including that of 1952, carry the Act of 1870

along which "abolished" both the writs of quo warranto and
scire facias, yet the Constitution of 1895 says: "The Supreme
Court shall have power to issue writs.., of... quo warranto,
. . . and other original and remedial writs." Probably the
reason why no Constitutional question has been raised as to
the validity of Sections 10-2251 through 10-2271 is because
the Act of 1870, now those Sections, really preserved, as
pointed out above, the old writ of quo warranto by providing
for all its essential features when substituting "civil actions"
therefore.
In Alexander v. McKenzie (1870), 2 S. C. 81, the Court at
page 86 solved the problem thus:
The question of jurisdiction, though not pressed, was
mooted upon the arguement, and it is proper that it
should be here considered. The right to adjudicate the
case, in its present form, depends upon whether the "question in difference" is "the subject of a civil action:'
Before the Code, civil actions did not, in a technical sense,
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include proceedings by quo warranto. Section 443 [now
Section 10-2251] abolishes the writ of quo warranto, and
proceedings by information in the nature of quo warranto, and provides instead thereof, "that the remedies
heretofore obtainable in those forms may be obtained
by civil actions." The Constitution (Art. IV, Sec. 4,)
declares that the Supreme Court "shall always have power
to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus, and such other original and remedial writs
as may be necessary to give it a general supervisory control over all other Courts in the State."
Under this grant of jurisdiction, it is to be considered, whether Section 443, so far as it abolishes the
writ of quo warranto, is operative as it regards the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court....
It is clear that it was not the intent of Sec. 4, Article
IV, of the Constitution, to place the writs enumerated
beyond the power of the Legislature to abolish them, as
to form, and substitute other forms in lieu thereof, so
long as the grant of jurisdiction in such cases remains unimpaired in the Supreme Court....
There is no direct expression of an intent to limit
the ordinary powers of the Legislature in respect to

moulding the forms of procedure in the Courts. To raise
such an intent by implication would be open to the objection of depriving the Legislature of customary and convenient powers, when no such implication is essential to
effectuate either the particular or general intent of the
Constitution. Such a construction would be especially
objectionable in view of the provisions of Sec. 3, Art. V,
making it the duty of the Legislature to enter upon a
thorough reorganization of the remedial system of the
State.
The argument that can be urged with greatest force
against this position is, in substance, that conferring
power to issue certain writs "always" implies that the
writs must always exist, otherwise they would not be issued. This would be a fair argument, if the actual issuing of mandates of a particular form, and attested in a
particular manner, was intended; but as the expressions
are used as terms of art, covering larger and more sub-
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stantial ideas, they are not subject to such nice verbal
criticism.
Although the Legislature could change the form of the
remedy, the jurisdiction of this Court remains based upon
the terms of the Constitution. This Court having, therefore jurisdiction of an action based upon the rights set
forth in the submission, the present case is properly before us, and we will proceed to dispose of the points made.
State v. Sanders (1920), 118 S. C. 498, 110 S. E. 808, tells
one at page 502 when it is not fatal to jurisdiction under Section 10-2251 to fail to serve a summons as is required for
starting a civil action.
We agree with defendant that Code Civ. Proc., §462,
abolished the writ of quo warranto and proceedings by
information in the nature of quo warranto, which were
usually commenced by the service of a rule to show cause;
and provides that the remedies theretofore obtainable in
that manner should thereafter be obtained by a civil
action, which the Code prescribes (Section 177) shall be
commenced by the service of a summons. It follows that
a summons should have been served upon defendant. State
v. Tollison, 95 S. C., 59; 78 S. E., 521. And it appears
that a summons in the usual form was prepared and
issued, but for some reason unexplained it was not served.
But, under the circumstances, the failure to serve it was
not fatal to the jurisdiction.
The purpose of the summons is to acquire jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant and to give him notice of
the action and an opportunity to appear and defend.
While Code Civ. Proc., § 178 et seq., prescribes the requisites of the summons, it does not provide that it shall be
in any particular form. And when we consider the purpose of the summons, in the light of the proceedings had
in this case, particularly the provisions contained in the
order of the Chief Justice and the allegations of the petition or complaint, and the prayer thereof, it is clear that
the objection of defendant is purely and highly technical,
and that to sustain it would be to sacrifice substance to
form, because the order and the petition together contained substantially every requisite of a summons prescribed by the Code, and defendant was neither misled
nor prejudiced in the slightest by the failure to serve him
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with a summons in due and regular form. While, as said,
the service of a summons is the manner prescribed by
the Code, and the usual means of acquiring jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant, and therefore it ought
to be observed in practice, as ought all other rules prescribed for an orderly system of procedure, nevertheless,
it is well understood by the profession, and it has frequently been held by the Courts, that it is not the only
method by which jurisdiction of the defendant may be
acquired. See Lyles v. Haskell, 35 S. C., 391, 14 S. E.,
829....
However, it should be noted that Section 10-2251 substituted an action for the writ of scire facias only as to civil
remedies. On the criminal side the old writ still exists and is
useable. As pointed out in State v. Wilder (1879), 13 S. C.
344, at page 345:
The grounds upon which jurisdiction is denied are,
that the provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of Chapter CXLII.,
(Gen. Stat. 750) under which the proceedings in these
cases were instituted, are practically identical with the
proceeding by writ of scire facias, and that writ being
abolished by Section 443 [now Section 10-2251] of the
code of procedure, and the remedies previously obtainable
in that form provided for by a civil action, the Court of
General Sessions, which, under the constitution, has no
civil jurisdiction, could not exercise the jurisdiction
claimed for it in these cases. A sufficient answer to
this is that the second part of the code, in which the
provision abolishing the writ of scire facias is found,
relates only to civil actions, and cannot, therefore, be construed so as to apply to criminal action or to any proceedings in the court invested with jurisdiction of such
actions. This provision must, therefore, be construed as
applying to that writ only, as it had heretofore been used
to obtain or enforce a civil right as contra-distinguished
from a criminal proceeding....
Writ of Mandamus: This is a discretionary writ, A. C. L.
R. R. v. R. R. Commissioners (1911), 89 S. C. 472, 72 S. E.
18. It used to be only a prerogative of the crown; now it can
be used by any one in a proper case. It can be used to compel
either judicial or quasi-judicial action, or to compel a public
officer to perform a ministerial duty. It cannot compel action

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss5/21

8

1959]

Whaley: Common Law Writs

HANDBOOK OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

193

where judgment or discretion is to. be exercised. As said in
the above case at page 482:
This issuance of the writ of mandamus is not a matter
of strict legal right, but it rests in the sound discretion
of the Court. Nothing is better settled than that mandamus will not be issued to control the discretion or judgment vested by law in public officers. If the commission
had not already considered and rejected the plans proposed by the petitioner, the Court could compel their consideration by the commission. Abbeville v. McMilan, 52
S. C., 60. But it could not direct the results of that consideration, unless the action of the commission with respect to the matter was so clearly arbitrary and capricious as not to admit of two reasonable opinions. Mauldin
v. Matthews, 81 S. C. 414, 62 S. E. 695. The commission
is invested by law with the authority to decide the questions of fact in such cases, and it is a body peculiarly
fitted to decide such questions. Therefore, its decision
of questions of fact, unless wholly without evidnece, is
final and conclusive....
Even the Governor can be mandamused where only a ministerial duty is involved. As declared in Easler v. Maybank
(1939), 191 S. C. 511, 5 S. E. 2d 288, at page 514:
That the Governor of South Carolina is subject to a
writ of mandamus to compel the performance of a purely
ministerial duty is no longer a controversial question.

See Blalock v. Johnston, 189 S. C., 40, 185 S.E., 51, 105
A. L. R., 1115.
Indeed, as hereinbefore indicated, the respondent does
not raise such issue. The issue raised is that Section
2330 makes it discretionary since it provides that one of
the contingencies therein enumerated must "be made to
appear to the satisfaction of the Governor." This is just
another case where the facts govern the law. The Legislature never intended that a Governor could close his eyes
to an admitted fact and say that such fact had not been
made to appear to his satisfaction. Respondent was advised of the holding of this Court that the election for
trustees of Saxon School District attempted to be held on
March 24, 1939, was null and void. The petition herein so
alleges, and the return of respondent admits it. The case
(Corn et al. v. Blackwell et al., supra), holding the elec-
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tion to be null and void, is a public record. So that, insofar as this case is concerned, the words "to the satisfaction of the Governor" may be treated as not being in
the statute.
We can reach no other conclusion, under the admitted
facts of this case, than that the ordering of a new election
for trustees of Saxon School District is purely a ministerial duty of the respondent...
An injunction may be incident to the use of the writ of
mandamus, as, for instance, in a mandamus action by judgment creditors against a town and its officers to compel levy
and collection of taxes for payment of judgments. As pointed
out in Lombard Iron Works v. Town of Allendale (1938), 187
S.C.89, 196 S. E. 513, at page 95:
Before proceeding with the issues arising in this case,
we quote from Judge Bellinger's order as to the characteristics of a writ of mandamus:
"Our Court in Federal Land Bank of Columbia v.State
Highway Department, 172 S.C. 207, 173 S.E., 635, 637,
and reaffirmed in Chesterfield County v. State Highway
Department,181 S.0., 323, 187 S.E., 548, said:
"'Mandamus is somewhat of a hybrid proceeding. It
is not a suit in tort, nor is it a suit in contract; it is not
strictly a law case, nor is it one in equity. It is based on
the theory that an officer charged with a purely ministerial duty can be compelled to perform that duty in case
of refusal. * * *' The same authority holds that where

there is an adequate remedy at law, mandamus will not
lie...."
And further on page 96:
In order to show sufficient funds the plaintiffs could
only do so by an action of accounting, for it must be
kept in mind that the current expenses of the town
must first be paid and that the bonded indebtedness of
the town is a first lien on the property within the limits
of the town. To prevent the officers of the town from
applying the public funds so collected in expenditures
other than the necessary current expenses, and bonded
indebtedness, and thereby defeat the rights of the creditors, and as an adjunct to the remedy for the enforcement
of the debts, are not the plaintiffs entitled to injunctive
relief?
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The writ of mandamus is not an adequate remedy in
that, while the writ enforces the officers to perform their
ministerial duty in collecting and levying taxes, the writ
does not prevent the waste of assets and of the taxes
collected. To protect against the possibility of wasting
of assets, the disbursement of funds beyond current expenses, the prohibitory powers of equity are necessary so
that the writ of mandamus will constitute an adequate
remedy. This does not substitute injunction for mandamus, but is an aid to the writ of mandamus and without
which the remedy of mandamus would not be complete.
See also Merrimon v. McCain (1942), 201 S. C. 76, 21 S. E.
2d 404, as to "mandatory injunction."
Now-a-days the writ is a proper remedy to make public utilities furnish service. State Ex Rel. Gwynn v. Citizens' Telephone Co. (1901), 61 S. C. 83, 39 S. E. 257, 55 L. R. A. 139,
85 Am. St. Rep. 870, lays down the rule at page 95:
..
In 25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, at page 750, we find
the following: "Telephone companies like telegraph companies are to some extent common carriers, and are bound
to afford equal facilities to all. They can be compelled
by mandamus to furnish facilities to one offering to comply with their regulations, even though such a party is a
rival company." To same effect, see page 775 of same
volume, and on page 775 it is said: "In many of the States

statutes exist which provide for the enforcement of these

obligations; but it seems that the rule would be the same
whether the obligation was declared by statute or considered as arising from the common law." ...
And the writ is also used to make public functionaries pay
official salaries. Gaffney v. Mallory et al. (1938), 186 S. C.
337, 195 S. E. 840.
Although, as heretofore noted, mandamus cannot be used
to tell an administrative agency how to exercise its judgment
or discretion, it may be used to compel "an administrative
agency to act by exercising its judgment or discretion."
Thomas v. Hollis (1958), - S. C., -, 102 S. E. 2d 110, 114.
The scope of this writ is outlined in Fort Sumter Hotel v.
Tax Commission (1942), 201 S. C. 50, 21 S. E. 2d 393, wherein
one is told at page 61:
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. . . It is true that while mandamus is not now usually
described, as it formerly was, as a high prerogative writ,
it is a somewhat extraordinary legal proceeding rather
than an equitable one, although it does adopt in practice
some of the equitable rules. But this does not operate to
extend the scope of the proceeding beyond the issues
properly involved.
And as to the governing principles involved one finds at
page 60:
...
The old case cited by counsel for the appellants, to
wit, State v. Bruce, 3 Brev., 264, 6 Am. Dec., 576, contains a concise and excellent statement of the governing
principles, to wit, "It is always incumbent upon him,
who claims the benefit of this process, to shew [show],
1. That he has a specific, legal right; and 2. That he hao
no other specific, legal remedy."
See also Godwin v. Carrigan (1955), 227 S. C. 216, 87 S. E.
2d 471, which tells. one that the "asserted right" of a petitioner must be "clear and certain."
Writ of Prohibition: At this point attention is called to
an important distinction between this writ and that of certiorari, namely, the former is purely a preventive writ; the lat-

ter, a curative one. Prohibition keeps a judicial or quasijudicial body from exercising wrongful jurisdiction, or, when
having proper jurisdiction, from exceeding its powers thereby
saving time and expense. Certiorari accomplishes the same
result, but only after time and money are wasted in hearing
and deciding the matter in the tribunal below. Of course the
modernized certiorari permits the reviewing court, if it finds
that the tribunal below had jurisdiction and did not exceed
the same, to review errors of law.
Though prohibition is merely preventive to keep a tribunal
from going out of bounds, in order to make its remedy complete, it will annul prior proceedings in the cause when that is
necessary. South Carolina has no case going that far, but it
would probably follow that modern tendency, as was done
in Havemeyer v. Superior Court (1890), 84 Cal. 327, 24 Pac.
121. As said in that case:
As we understand the authorities on this point, the
operation of the writ of prohibition is excluded only in
cases where the action of the inferior tribunal is com-
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pleted, and nothing remains to be done in pursuance of
its void order. If its action is not completed and ended,
its further proceedings may be stayed; and, if it is necessary for the purpose of affording complete and adequate relief, what has been done will be undone.
Like certiorari and mandamus, the writ of prohibition will
not issue if there is another adequate remedy; as where one
can appeal, and if the appeal will afford a complete and adequate remedy. This is true, even though time and expense
will have to be wasted below in bringing the cause to a conclusion there before being able to appeal.
South Carolina has what seems to be some peculiar twists
to this writ. In Johnson v. Jones (1931), 160 S. C. 63, 158

S. E. 134, 77 A. L. R. 235, the court not only said that the
writ lies to prevent usurpation or improper assumption of
power by either an inferior judicial body or a public officer,
but to prevent "great outrage" on general principles of law
or procedure. What a "great outrage" is one has never been
told. It has been suggested that if a judge or public officer
attempted to hear a matter while under the influence of intoxicants, that would be a "great outrage" for which the writ
would be at once usable. Fortunately, this state has never
had such a situation and with the high tone of her judiciary
and public officers probably never will. So some other situation will have to arise to aid us in ascertaining to what that
phrase will be applicable. As said at page 68:
The ancient prerogative writ of prohibition has been
recognized and employed in the common-law system of
jurisprudence for more than seven centuries, and like
all prerogative writs should be used with forbearance
and caution, and only in cases of necessity. It is primarily a preventive process, and is only incidentally remedial. It was originally designed to perfect the administration of justice and for the "control of subordinate
functionaries and authorities," but its principal modern
use, stated generally, is to prevent the assumption and
exercise of jurisdiction by an inferior Court or tribunal
in cases where wrong, damage, and injustice are liable
to follow such action. 22 R. C. L., pp. 4 and 5.
With regard to the function and scope of the writ, it
has been settled in this State from an early period that

it will only lie to prevent an encroachment, excess, usur-
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pation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on the
part of an inferior Court or tribunal, or to prevent some
great outrage upon the settled principles of law and procedure; but, if the inferior Court or tribunal has jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter of the controversy, the writ will not lie to correct errors and irregularities in procedure, or to prevent an erroneous decision or an enforcement of an erroneous judgment, or
even in cases of encroachment, usurpation, and abuse
of judicial power or the improper assumption of jurisdiction, where an adequate and applicable remedy by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or other prescribed meth-

ods of review are available....
State Board of Bank Control v. Sease (1938), 188 S. C.
133, 198 S. E. 602, lays down the very broad rule that the
writ is not usable, if the matter could be ruled on below and
come up on appeal, unless it is a situation of emergency.
That case almost strips the writ of its function as originally
conceived, for it would seem that the right of appeal, which
nearly always exists, would keep the writ almost entirely
out of the legal picture. However, may be the court meant
to include in "emergency" all situations where the appeal
would be inadequate. But even then that would always seem
to limit the writ to only such situations and they would be
relatively few.
The foregoing case gives an excellent illustration of what
is an "emergency," as shown by the Zimmerman case cited
therein where the Court took original jurisdiction and decided the case on its merits. Beginning at page 137 the decision states:
And of course the writ may not be invoked to perform
the office of an appeal.
In the present case it cannot be said that there is
any such emergency as was presented in the case of
State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Gibbes, 171 S. C., 209, 172
S. E. 130, to warrant this Court in departing from the

application of the foregoing principles. When the Zim.
merman case was presented to the Court, economic chaos
threatened the nation; financial institutions of all kinds
were tottering, not because of insolvency, but because of
a panic which was causing people to withdraw and hoard
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their funds. These conditions brought about the enactment of legislation, both State and federal, that was
strictly of an emergency character, and was so designated. It was under such conditions, and to deal with
legislation of that character, that this Court assumed
original jurisdiction in the Zimmerman case, and undertook therein to dispose of all of the issues presented by
the pleadings.
In the present case we are not dealing with any emergency in the economic field, nor even with an extraordinary emergency relating to the particular financial
institutions in question; and the legislation whose constitutionality, application and construction are involved
here is permanent legislation, with no emergency characteristics of any kind.
We can find no justification under the facts presented
by the petition herein for departing from the orderly

processes of the law. These procesess contemplate, especially in a case involving matters of constitutional law,
the proper presentation of the issues before the Circuit
Court; the full argument of the issues before such Court;
the disposition of such issues by that Court; and the submission of the final issues to the Supreme Court in the
light of the considered judgment of the Circuit Court,
and of arguments of counsel weighted with the experience obtained in the contest in the Circuit Court.
There are other important considerations that lead us
to reject the petition herein.
The petitioners were and are not without an adequate
remedy at law. In the Mechanics Building and Loan case
the petitioners could have intervened in the Circuit Court,
and if after full argument the decision had gone against
them, they would have had the right of appeal. .In the
Home Building and Loan case, the petitioners were before the Circuit Court, and could have appealed from the
ruling of that Court. The appeal in each case would have
brought before this Court every issue sought to be presented in the present proceeding.
... Each case must depend on its own facts. It suffices
to say in this case that the two cases in the Circuit Court
that are affected by the present proceeding should be
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thoroughly thrashed out in that Court both on the facts
and on the law, and a proper and complete record in each
case presented to this Court through the usual process
of appeal, or by such other proceeding as may be appropriate.
Woodworth et al. v. Gallman et al. (1940), 195 S. C. 157,
10 S. E. 2d 316, also dealt with an "emergency" as was the
situation in the Zimmerman case. In the former case the
moving criterion doesn't seem to have been wrongful assumption of jurisdiction but rather inadequacy of legal remedy to
the extent that the Supreme Court really took exclusive jurisdiction by prohibiting action below as delay would have been
a death sentence to the "Housing Authority," thus also creating a dire "emergency," and hence the Supreme Court itself
disposed of all issues. Quoting from the Zimmerman case,

supra, the Court declared:
The question, however, whether the remedy is inadequate, is one within the sound discretion of the court
to which application is made for the issuance of the writ,
and is to be determined on the facts of each particular
case. And in this connection the court may properly consider the delay and inconvenience incident to appeal,
although the inadequacy of such remedy will not be
tested solely by these considerations. It is to be kept in
mind that the right of prohibition is defeated, not by the
exercise, but by the adequacy, of the remedy by ap...

peal. * * *

After a careful examination of the record, it appearing
that time is of the essence, we are of the opinion, in view
of the importance of the case, that we should grant a writ
of prohibition and assume original jurisdiction, to the
end that there may be a speedy determination of the case.
We think the issues presented by the complaint in the
injunction suit and the demurrer filed thereto by the
defendants in that action, who are the petitioners here,
may be disposed of now by this Court.
Ex Pcrte Wingate (1932), 166 S. C. 440, 165 S. E. 176,
where, although the right of appeal would have clearly existed
and would seem to have been adequate, the court neither mentioned it, nor did it allude to any "emergency" but granted
the writ because of wrongful assumption of jurisdiction by
the trial judge, following Johnson v. Jones, supra,and saying:
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The writ of prohibition, like other writs of a more or
less drastic nature, should only be issued where the reason therefor is plain and caution should always be exercised. However, the writ is permissible to prevent the
improper assumption of jurisdiction.
Habeas Corpus: This is a civil writ but at first was only
used where there was illegal restraint by a public officer. It
has now been liberalized as to when it can be used. For instance, where there is such restraint by a private person or
by private authority, as for example, by a private sanitarium.
39 C. J. S. 441.
The writer held that it was properly usable in the Richland
County Court where a 10 year old negro girl was not allowed

to leave a negro sanitarium when well enough to go, because
her mother didn't have enough money to pay the entire bill.
The child was told she would have to stay and pay her own
way out by washing dishes and cleaning floors. The court
ordered her released at once. There was no appeal.
There exists a peculiar situation in South Carolina with
regard to how custody by a parent, or proper party, may be
obtained. Carroll v. Carro (1930), 158 S. C. 162, 155 S. E.
271, lays down the rule that where there is illegal restraint
the writ lies, but where there is no such restraint, as in that
case, or where one parent is seeking to gain custody of a child
from the other, the writ is not usable, but a suit for possession by service of summons and complaint is the proper procedure. In the order of Judge Dennis which was affirmed by
the Court it was stated:
Upon the question of jurisdiction, the contention of
the defendant is that the proceeding by summons and
complaint seeking a restraining order is not the proper
remedy to adjudicate the possession of an infant child,
but that the proceeding under which such judgment may
be obtained is one by habeas corpus by which the infant
is brought into the Court.
The proceeding by habeas corpus is one in which the
person sought to be taken into custody is illegally restrained of its freedom. The remedy by habeas corpus
could not apply in this case, according to the allegations
of the complaint, for the reason that, when the amended
complaint was served, the child was not under illegal
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restraint, but was technically in the possession of the
sheriff.
The contention of the defendant that the complaint
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action, I do not think is well taken. I am not ready to
decide, nor'has any authority to that effect been cited
me by counsel, that a cause of action does not lie in
an ordinary summons and complaint under which the
Court can determine the possession of a child as between
its mother and father in a case in which there is not
alleged illegal restraint, nor am I ready to adjudge that
a father and mother in this state under the practice in

our Court cannot adjudicate between themselves in an
ordinary action at common law the right to the possession
of their child.
There seems, however, to be an underlying antipathy among
some members of the Bar to using the latter process for a
child and thereby putting the small human being in the category of chattels and little animals. This is inferable from
several of the later cases where illegal restraint was lacking,
but which have used the writ. An outstanding example is
Pettus v. Taylor (1943), 202 S. C. 530, 25 S.E. 2d 45, a case
between mother and cousin. Habeas corpus was used. No
point was made against it, and no attention was called to the
Carroll decision. Also Douglass v. Merriman (1931), 163
S. C. 210, 161 S.E. 452.
Two later cases, however, even the score, as in them action
was brought. Cutshaw v. Harvey (1953), 223 S. C. 276, 75
S. E. 2d 602, and Williams v. Rogers (1954), 224 S. C. 425,
79 S.E. 2d 464.
Habeas Corpus Writ is not Substitute for Appeal: Since
Habeas Corpus can only raise the question of jurisdiction, it
cannot be used as a substitute for appeal to correct judicial
errors. Medlock v. Spearman, Supervisor (1937), 185 S. C.
296, 194 S. E. 2d. It was held therein at page 300, where
the order of Judge Oxner was adopted as the opinion of the
court:

In the case of Ex parte Klugh, supra, the Court said:
"Where the validity of a judgment or sentence is collaterally attacked in determining whether the error claimed
to exist is jurisdictional or judicial, the test in respect
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thereto is this: Could the Court, under any circumstances
of the particular case made by the pleadings, have properly reached the final result embodied in the judgment
rendered or in the sentence imposed? If it could, then
the alleged error manifestly is not jurisdictional, but judicial, reviewable only upon appeal."
We find the following in 29 Corpus Juris, page 46:
"The sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain the

charge upon the prisoner is held, even where there is
a total absence of evidence, or the correctness of the
Court's rulings in the admission or exclusion of evidence,
cannot be reviewed on habeas Corpus. Questions of fact
cannot be retried."
The same principle is stated by the Supreme Court of
the United States, in the Matter of Gregory, 219 U. S.,
219, 31 S. Ct., 143, 55 L. Ed., 184, as follows: "Habeas
corpus proceeding cannot be made to perform the function of a writ of error, and we are not concerned with
the question whether the information was sufficient, or
whether the acts set forth in the agreed statement constituted a crime, that is to say, whether the Court properly applied the law, if it be found that the Court had
jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the judgment. * * * This rule has recently been applied in a

case where it was contended in a habeas corpus proceeding that the record should be examined to determine
whether there was any testimony to support the accusation. And this Court, affirming the judgment which
discharged the writ, said by Mr. Justice Day: 'The contention is that, in the respects pointed out, the testimony
wholly fails to support the charge. The attack is thus
not upon the jurisdiction and authority of the Court. to
proceed to investigate and determine the truth of the
charge, but upon the sufficiency of the evidence to show
the guilt of the accused. This has never been held to
be within the province of a writ of habeas corpus. Upon

habeas corpus the Court examines only the power and
authority of the Court to act, not the correctness of its
conclusions.'...

Excessive Partof Sentence can be Attacked by Use of Writ:
As said in Ex Parte Klugh (1925), 132 S. C. 199, 128 S. E.
882, at page 206:
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... And the jurisdiction of a Court to render a particular
judgment or impose a particular sentence may be a proper
subject of inquiry on habeas corpus. Where, for example,
it appears upon the face of the record that a Court having jurisdiction both of the person and of the subject
matter has imposed an excessive sentence, that is, one by
which a greater punishment is inflicted than the maximum allowed by law, and where it further appears that
the prisoner, at the time of his application for discharge
on habeas corpus, has served out the maximum term of
imprisonment to which the Court had power to sentence
him, according to the prevailing rule and the better doctrine, so much of such sentence as is excessive will be
declared void, and the prisoner discharged on habeas
corpus....
That decision also declared on page 206 that the constitutionality of a statute can be tested by use of the writ, as
well as the competency of jurisdiction of the trial court.

Supreme Court Can Grant Bail Under Writ Even After
Conviction: As stated in State v. Farris (1897), 51 S. C. 176,
28 S. E. 370, at page 177:
. . . The prisoner applied for and obtained a writ of
habeas corpus, for the purpose of procuring bail pending
his appeal. So that the question presented for the decision of this Court is whether the prisoner is entitled to
bail under the circumstances of this case, as shown by
the affidavits and other papers submitted at the hearing.
The application for bail was resisted by the solicitor
mainly upon the ground that no authority was conferred
upon this Court, or any other tribunal, to grant bail after
conviction, where, as in this case, the punishment imposed exceeded imprisonment for a term of ten years.
Sec. 4 of art. V. of the present Constitution declares that
"The Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs or
orders of injunction, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and other original and
remedial writs." This necessarily implies that the Supreme Court may grant any relief for which such writs
are an appropriate remedy. Now it is very certain that
the writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate mode of
bringing before the Court any person confined in jail,
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or otherwise deprived of his personal liberty, for the
purpose of inquiring into the cause of the capture or detention of such person, and after such inquiry the Court
may determine whether the person in custody is entitled
to an absolute discharge or only to a conditional discharge, to wit: upon his giving bail to appear and answer to the charge under which he is confined. This
Court, therefore, has no doubt of its power to grant bail
in any case where a person is in custody under a charge
of violating the criminal law of the State.
This being a power conferred upon the Supreme Court
by the Constitution, it might be an interesting inquiry,
whether such power could be taken away or abridged
by an act of the legislature; but as we are not aware of
any statute by which the legislature has undertaken
either to abridge or take away such power from this
Court, we do not deem it either necessary or proper
to enter upon such inquiry at this time. Sec. 75 of the
Criminal Statutes (2 Rev. Stat., p. 283,) has been referred to as depriving a person, after conviction, of the
right to bail in certain cases. That section reads as
follows: "It shall not be lawful for any Justice of the

Supreme Court, or any Circuit Judge of this State, pending an appeal to the Supreme Court, to grant bail to
any person who shall have been convicted of any offense,
the punishment whereof is death, or imprisonment for
life, or imprisonment for any term exceeding ten years."
It is very manifest from the language used in this section that it has no application to the Supreme Court,
for its provisions are, in express terms, confined to a
single Justice of the Supreme Court and to the Circuit
Judges. The very fact that the language is so confined,
affords a strong inference that the legislature did not
intend to undertake to abridge the powers of this Court
in granting bail, either before or after conviction in any
case; a power which was exercised by this Court in
the case of State v. McFail, 36 S. C., 605. In accordance
with these views, an order has been passed, granting
the prisoner bail upon the terms specified in the order.
Original Jurisdiction of Supreme Court as to Writ: In
City of Sumter v. Boyle (1924), 128 S. C. 535, 123 S. E. 9,
the writ was used in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
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Court to test the validity of a city ordinance. The Court
could entertain original jurisdiction but in that case, since
an issue of fact arose, the writ could not be used. As said
at page 538:
The ordinance does not require that an abattoir operated by individuals, shall be substantially the same
as that installed by the city, but that "it shall be conducted under and subject to rules and regulations substantially similar to those contained in the ordinance." If
the city, under color of this ordinance, was endeavoring
to enforce such a condition, not warranted by the ordinance, and refused to approve the plant of the defendant's company upon that ground alone, the defendant
would be entitled to discharge under the writ; but this
fact, as has been seen, is denied by the city; on the
contrary, it is alleged that the cause of its refusal to
approve the plant was that it was not being conducted
as the ordinance required. This presented an issue of
fact, which could not be determined upon writ of habeas
corpus.
Suspension of Writ by Governor: In Hearon v. Calus
(1985), 178 S. C. 381, 183 S. E. 13, an action was brought in
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and an injunction prayed for against the appointees of the Governor
to the State Highway Commission. The Governor had by
proclamation suspended the writ of habeas corpus and called
out the militia because he declared there was an insurrection
in connection with the State Highway Department. This he
did pursuant to Section 23, Art. 1 of the Constitution. However, the Court decided there was no basis for calling out
the militia and suspending the writ and a permanent injunction was granted, the Court saying at page 407:
It is borne in mind that at the time the proclamation
of the Governor was issued declaring a state of insur* rection, there was no violence existent in or threatened by the State Highway Department or the State
Highway Commission.
When the Governor called out the militia and suspended the writ of habeas corpus, he, in effect, declared
martial law.
And at page 410:
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It is within the province of this Court to inquire into
and review the actions of the Governor with the view to
determine whether, after declaring that a state of insurrection exists, he has exceeded the powers given him by

the Constitution and the Statutes in pursuance thereof.

To that end we must relate the things he has done to the
purposes for which he declared that insurrenction [insurrection] existed and called out the militia to suppress it.
In seeking to ascertain the intent or purpose for which
the proclamation declaring a state of insurrection to
exist and calling out the militia, was issued, we may
properly scan the proclamation itself and the contemporaneous statement to the citizens of South Carolina made
by the Governor and published in the newspapers.
And again at page 414:
We repeat that this Court may not enjoin his declaration of a state of insurrection, but it has power to review
what he did thereafter.
It does not need the reiteration of the authorities hereinabove recited to show that the avowed purpose of the
Governor to remove Ben Sawyer and all of the plaintiffs
as Highway Commissioners is wholly unrelated to the
power given him by the Constitution and the Statutes
to declare a state of insurrection, and is beyond that
power. His use of the militia to take possession, under
the muzzles of machine guns and rifles, of the offices
of plaintiffs as State Highway Commissioners is without
authority and is in excess of his constitutional power.
His appointment of and maintenance of the defendants,
Joe Calus, Francis Drake, Wade Sanders, Robert Gregory, W. M. Smoak, and Walter Stilley, Jr., in the place
and stead of plaintiffs, is beyond his right and power.
He has no power of right in law to use the militia to
discharge the duties of a civil office. He has deprived

the plaintiffs of the offices of State Highway Commissioners, of which they were in peaceful possession and
to the emoluments and privileges of which they were
entitled without due process of law, in violation of the
provisions of Article 1, §5, of the Constitution of South
Carolina, and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States.
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Superintending Control: This really is a power inclusive
of all the old writs with the added judicial power of making
new ones where necessary. Such additional power is granted
by Sections 4 and 15 of Art. 5 of the South Carolina Constitution to the Supreme Court and to the Circuit Courts, respectively, though it evidently has not been necessary as yet
for such power to be exercised.
Other Old Common Law Writs Not as Yet Used in South
Carolina: (1) Writ of error coram nobis meaning "before
us," when used, corrects an error of fact made by the court
that rendered the decision; the court using the same record
and process that was before it when making its initial decision. 18 C. J. S. page 281.
(2) Writ of error coram vobis, meaning "before you,"
goes to the trial court from the court of review ordering
the inferior court to correct an error of fact but not telling
it how to do so. 18 C. J. S. page 281.
Writ of procedendo is a common law prerogative writ going
from a chancery court to an inferior court, which is unreasonably delaying judgment ordering it to make a decision without specifying what such decision should be. 72 C. J. S.
page 971.
The old common law writ of supersedeas which was used "as
an auxiliary process to supersede the enforcement of a judgment of a court below" is no longer used in South Carolina.
It is now statutory as will be seen by reference to Code sections and Supreme Court rules with their respective annotations. See sections 7-412, 7-415, 7-422, 10-1231, 15-135,
15-1275, 58-473 and others as noted in the Code Index; also
Supreme Court rules 18 and 28.
Changes Made by Statute: It should be noted that the old
common law writ of habeas corpus has undergone quite a few
statutory changes, especially with reference to criminal cases.
Hence there should be a careful reading of Sections 17-351
to 17-369 with their annotations.
County Courts, Jurisdiction as to Writs: The legislature
specifically gave power to a number of county courts to issue
"writs of habeas corpus in all cases," including the Richland
County Court. Section 15-769. As to some other county
courts, see Sections 15-659, 15-718 and 15-808.
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